The Library of Babel for Prior Art: Using Artificial Intelligence to Mass Produce Prior Art in Patent Law by Yordy, Lucas R.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 74 
Issue 2 March 2021 Article 1 
3-2021 
The Library of Babel for Prior Art: Using Artificial Intelligence to 
Mass Produce Prior Art in Patent Law 
Lucas R. Yordy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucas R. Yordy, The Library of Babel for Prior Art: Using Artificial Intelligence to Mass Produce Prior Art in 
Patent Law, 74 Vanderbilt Law Review 521 (2021) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol74/iss2/1 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
       
 
521 
The Library of Babel for Prior Art: 
Using Artificial Intelligence to Mass 
Produce Prior Art in Patent Law 
 
Artificial intelligence is playing an increasingly important role in the 
invention and innovation processes of our society. To date, though, much of the 
academic discussion on the interaction of artificial intelligence and the patent 
system focuses on the patentability of inventions produced by artificial 
intelligence. Little attention has been paid to organizations that are seeking to 
use artificial intelligence to defeat the patentability of otherwise patent-worthy 
inventions by mass producing prior art. This Note seeks to highlight the 
consequences of allowing mass-produced, AI-generated prior art to render 
valuable inventions unpatentable. Specifically, this Note concludes that AI-
generated prior art decreases the incentive for researchers to disclose valuable 
knowledge through the patent system without providing an adequate substitute 
source of such knowledge. This Note also examines a number of patent law 
doctrines that should, but likely will not, prevent deficient AI-generated prior 
art from rendering valuable inventions unpatentable. To resolve these issues, 
this Note proposes a solution that modifies the current novelty inquiry and 
breathes new life into the patent law doctrine of conception. This solution 
advances the patent system’s purpose of promoting technological advancement 
while still allowing artificial intelligence to play a large role in that 
technological advancement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If artificial intelligence (“AI”) publishes a description of an 
invention on the internet, but no person, or even the AI itself, recognizes 
that the text actually describes a new invention, does society gain 
anything from the publication? Probably not. But that same description 
could prevent a later inventor from receiving a patent, thus diminishing 
the inventor’s incentive to create, disclose, and commercialize the 
invention. This could delay or completely prevent the public from ever 
benefitting from the invention.  
It is no surprise that artificial intelligence will play a major role 
in future innovation.1 Around the world, researchers have already filed 
patent applications on AI-created inventions, such as a drink container 
based on fractal geometry and a device that uses flickering light to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of 
Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079 (2016) (arguing that creative computers should receive inventor 
status and discussing the potential implications that may arise under such an Intellectual 
Property regime); Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer 
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1681, 1702–03 (1997) 
(arguing that the output of creative computers should not receive protection under intellectual 
property laws and should enter the public domain instead). 
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assist in search and rescue operations.2 Currently though, the U.S. and 
European Patent Offices reject patent applications that lack a human 
inventor.3 Without the incentive of receiving a patent, there is little 
motivation for businesses to invest in AI-produced inventions.4 Yet 
these applications may still be useful because, if published, they can 
prevent human inventors from obtaining a patent on the same 
invention.5 As a result, some organizations are using AI to 
indiscriminately prevent others from receiving patent protection for 
their inventions rather than using AI to invent.6  
These organizations are using AI to algorithmically generate 
millions of lines of text, the equivalent of the Library of Babel,7 with the 
hope that some of the text will contain descriptions of new inventions.8 
Rather than pursuing patents for these inventions, the entities publish, 
or “strategically disclose,” these texts.9 A patent examiner10 may then 
use these published texts as prior art—evidence that an invention is 
already known to the public or would be obvious to make—which may 
 
 2. Dennis Crouch, USPTO Rejects AI-Invention for Lack of a Human Inventor, PATENTLY-O 
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/04/rejects-invention-inventor.html 
[https://perma.cc/EAE9-4YHL]; Emma Woollacott, European Patent Office Rejects World’s First AI 
Inventor, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2020, 7:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2020/ 
01/03/european-patent-office-rejects-worlds-first-ai-inventor/#991508c5cd00 
[https://perma.cc/68BM-SQUF]. 
 3. Crouch, supra note 2; Woollacott, supra note 2. 
 4. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (prohibiting patents for inventions that are “otherwise available to 
the public”). 
 6. See Benefits, CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/benefits/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4FB4-EHS3] (offering the production of prior art through artificial intelligence 
as a service to prevent others from obtaining patents); About, ALL PRIOR ART, http://allpriorart. 
com/about/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B4ZJ-LZGZ] (“All Prior Art is a project 
attempting to algorithmically create and publicly publish all possible new prior art, thereby 
making the published concepts not patent-able.”). 
 7. The Library of Babel, which is highly analogous to large-scale AI-generation of prior art, 
is a fictional library that contains all possible books and, thus, the solutions to all possible 
problems. Jorge Luis Borges, The Library of Babel, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 112, 112 (Andrew 
Hurley trans., Penguin Books 1999) (1944). But “[f]or every rational line or forthright statement 
there are leagues of senseless cacophony . . . .” Id. at 114. “[T]he Library is the greatest imaginable 
source of information . . . . But the Library’s vastness and disorganization also make it almost 
completely useless . . . .” James Grimmelmann, Information Policy for the Library of Babel, 3 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 29, 29 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 8. See Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinte Monkeys and Artificial 
Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 35 (2015) (“Cloem is attempting . . . to use brute-force 
computing to mechanically compose text for thousands of patent claims covering potentially novel 
inventions . . . .”). 
 9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 10. Patent Examiners have the primary role of examining patent applications and then 
granting or rejecting the applications. Sue A. Purvis, The Role of a Patent Examiner, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/offices/ous/ 
04082013_StonyBrookU.pdf [https://perma.cc/N88B-AMTX]. 
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defeat the patentability of an invention if the evidence meets certain 
statutory and judicial requirements.11  
The amount of information a piece of prior art must disclose to 
defeat the patentability of an invention is notably less than what a 
patentee must disclose in a patent application for the patent to issue.12 
The divergent standards for patent application disclosure and prior art 
disclosure may have been inconsequential with traditional forms of 
strategic disclosure. But the increasing presence of AI-generated prior 
art exploits these differences to thwart patents from issuing on valuable 
inventions while providing fewer societal benefits than traditional 
strategic disclosure. This undermines patent law’s goal of incentivizing 
the creation and disclosure of new inventions because, as the likelihood 
of receiving a patent decreases, inventors may protect their inventions 
under less societally beneficial trade secret law or may not invent  
at all.13  
This Note argues that courts should adapt to AI-generated prior 
art by eliminating the existing presumption that prior art is enabling 
and by implementing a conception requirement for prior art. Part II 
discusses some of the standards for patentability and the disclosure 
requirements for prior art and patent applications. Part III analyzes 
whether current AI-generated disclosures satisfy the requirements to 
be prior art, explains the impact that large-scale AI-generated prior art 
has on the patent system, and distinguishes AI-generated disclosures 
from traditional prior art. Part IV presents a solution for managing 
large-scale AI-generated prior art, not by categorically excluding AI-
generated disclosures from being prior art but by eliminating the 
 
 11. See Vic Lin, What Is Prior Art?, PAT. TRADEMARK BLOG, http://www.patenttrademark 
blog.com/what-is-prior-art/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SL9C-5CFR] (“The term 
‘prior art’ is frequently used in the patent world to refer to what already exists. It’s the old stuff 
that can’t be patented again. Prior art may consist of documents, things and processes that have 
been sold or used in the past.”); see also infra Section I.C.1 (discussing the requirements for a 
disclosure to be prior art). 
 12. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 936–40 (2011) 
(discussing the differences in the standards and burdens of proof for patent-supporting and patent 
defeating enablement). 
 13. Trade Secrets provide less benefit to society because the owner of a trade secret does not 
have to provide the public with details about the invention, unlike a patent applicant, who must 
provide enough teaching in the patent application to allow others to make and use the invention. 
See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how incentivizing inventors to keep information secret “denies society the 
benefits of disclosure stemming from the patent system, which are anathema to trade secrets”); 
Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173, 
173–75 (2005) (discussing how firms can retain trade secrets while disclosing enough information 
to thwart rival patents).  
        
2021] USING AI TO MASS PRODUCE PRIOR ART 525 
presumption that prior art is enabling14 and requiring that all potential 
pieces of prior art satisfy a conception requirement before qualifying as 
prior art. In doing so, this solution advances the utilitarian purposes of 
the patent system of promoting innovation and the dissemination of 
information while giving credence to the ability of AI to generate new 
and useful information. 
I. THE DIFFERING REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY AND PRIOR ART 
A. The Utilitarian Justification for Patent Law 
To understand the problems amplified by large-scale AI-
generated disclosures, it is crucial to understand the purpose of U.S. 
patent law. The patent system is predominantly justified on utilitarian 
grounds.15 Referred to as the patent law quid pro quo, the patent system 
gives inventors a limited monopoly on their inventions in exchange for 
disclosing their inventions to the public.16 Without a monopoly, 
inventors would be underincentivized to create and disclose their 
inventions.17 And without disclosure of the inventions, society may 
 
 14. The enablement requirement in patent law often refers to the statutory requirement that 
a patent application must teach how to make and use the described invention in order for a patent 
to be granted. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description . . . of 
the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the [invention] . . . .”). 
However, like patent applications, prior art must be enabling to serve as patentability-defeating 
prior art. See infra notes 55–68 (discussing the anticipatory enablement requirement of prior art). 
The major difference between anticipatory enablement, the level of enablement required from 
prior art, and enablement required from a patent application is that patent applications must 
enable an ordinary person in the relevant field to make and use the invention while prior art must 
simply teach such a person how to make the invention. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 
1969) (“[Section] 112 provides that the [patent application] must enable one skilled in the art to 
‘use’ the invention whereas § 102 makes no such requirement as to [prior art].”). 
 15. 1 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2019: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS 167 (2019). 
 16. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo . . . for 
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial 
utility.” (emphasis added)); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refin. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 
(1944) (“[T]he quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one 
skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 17. This is because information, unlike tangible property, is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. 
CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 30 (4th ed. 2017). Information is nonexcludable because 
once disclosed, it is difficult to prevent others from using it. Id. at 31. Information is nonrivalrous 
because many people can benefit from it without preventing others from using it at the same time. 
Id. This is because inventors need to disclose and commercialize their inventions in order to recoup 
their research and development costs, but an unprotected disclosure would allow competitors to 
copy the invention and compete with the inventor. Id. Thus, there is a need to limit access and use 
of the information to prevent competition from others who have not invested in the production of 
the information. Id. Increased competition from those who did not invest in producing the 
information would decrease market prices and result in under-investment in invention. Id. at 35. 
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never receive the benefits of the knowledge that a patent application 
provides to the public, which allows others to improve upon the 
patented invention and grows the general storehouse of knowledge.18 
This disclosure function also places a limit on a patent monopoly by 
enabling others to make and use an invention once the patent has 
expired19 and by preventing the patentee from extending his monopoly 
beyond the patent term by keeping details of the invention secret.20 
Thus, at the cost of a limited monopoly, the patent system benefits 
society by incentivizing the disclosure of new information that 
ultimately “foster[s] the cross-pollination of ideas” and “drive[s] [ ] more 
creative innovation.”21 
B. What Is Prior Art? 
As will be discussed in Section II.C, an invention must meet 
certain requirements⎯namely, that it be new and nonobvious—before 
a patent can be granted.22 Particularly, the invention must be new and 
nonobvious compared to the prior art. The term “prior art” refers 
generally to the existing body of knowledge in a field from which an 
examiner can draw to find that an invention is unpatentable.23 A prior 
art reference is a particular piece of evidence that shows what 
information was known in the field before a given invention was made.24 
Almost anything can be a prior art reference. The categories of prior art 
references are enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 102 and include patents, 
 
 18. Id. at 91. 
 19. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933) (discussing 
how the public receives the knowledge of the invention and the ability to practice it after the 
expiration of the patent). 
 20. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 130 (2006). 
(discussing how the disclosure requirements prevent patentees from retaining important details 
for practicing an invention in the best manner while giving an inferior disclosure to the public). 
 21. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 661 
(2010). 
 22. See infra Section II.C.   
 23. See Lin, supra note 11 (“The term ‘prior art’ is frequently used in the patent world to refer 
to what already exists.”). However, the term “prior art” is sometimes used to refer only to prior art 
references that can legally be used to support a rejection of a patent application. Gene Quinn, What 
Is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG, (Oct. 2, 2010), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-prior-
art/id=12677/ [https://perma.cc/7WPM-QXF6]. 
 24. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
123, 149, 192 (referring to particular pieces of prior art as references). 
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printed publications, and events, like a public use25 or sale26, that make 
the invention publicly available.27 Even movie scenes and the Bible can 
be prior art references.28  
For a prior art reference to be a patentability-defeating prior art 
reference—one an examiner can legally use to support the rejection of 
a patent application—the reference must meet certain requirements. 
These prior art requirements fall into two categories: practical and 
substantive. The practical requirements, found in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–
(b), dictate the availability and timing required for a reference or 
disclosure to be patentability-defeating prior art against a particular 
patent application.29 The substantive requirements dictate the 
information or knowledge a disclosure must provide to be patentability-
defeating prior art.30 The substantive requirements discussed  
below, such as strict identity and anticipatory enablement, are  
judicial doctrines.31 
1. The Practical Requirements  
The foremost practical requirement for a disclosure to be 
patentability-defeating prior art is that the disclosure was made 
publicly available before the earliest effective filing date of the patent 
 
 25. A public use includes both public uses by the inventor as well as “any use of [the claimed] 
invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation 
of secrecy to the inventor.” Netscape Commc’ns. Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 26. For the definition of a sale, see Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (“[T]o be on sale under § 102(b), a product must be the subject of a commercial sale or offer 
for sale, and that a commercial sale is one that bears the general hallmarks of a sale pursuant to 
Section 2-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Note that this list is nonexhaustive of the forms of prior art because 
Congress added the phrase “or otherwise available to the public” during the enactment of the 
America Invents Act. Compare Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C § 102 (2006) (omitting the phrase “or 
otherwise available”), with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (including the 
phrase “or otherwise available”). 
 28. Stewart Walsh, Prior Borat? Non-traditional Prior Art Rejections!, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 
24, 2012), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/24/prior-borat-non-traditional-prior-art-rejections 
/id=22837/ [https://perma.cc/6L3E-6MWZ]. 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b). 
 30. For example, strict identity requires that a prior art reference contain each and every 
limitation of the invention. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all 
elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). 
 31. See NARD, supra note 17, at 5–6, 253–56 (discussing the development of these doctrines). 
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application at issue.32 The earliest effective filing date may be the actual 
filing date of the patent application at issue, or it may be the filing date 
of a related patent application.33 While a disclosure or reference may 
take many statutorily enumerated forms,34 AI-produced disclosures are 
most analogous to the category of “printed publications.”35 Thus, this 
discussion will focus on printed publications. 
Public accessibility is the “touchstone” for determining whether 
a reference is a “printed publication” under § 102.36 A court will deem a 
reference publicly accessible if it was “disseminated or otherwise made 
available [so] that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in 
the . . . art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.”37 While 
disclosures such as academic journals are clearly printed publications, 
the analysis is more complicated in cases like a doctoral thesis indexed 
in a library, a slide presentation at a conference, or an online article.38 
Regardless of form, courts generally interpret “exercising reasonable 
diligence” without considering the actual efforts required to access the 
information, which allows references that are practically inaccessible to 
still qualify as patentability-defeating prior art references.39   
For cases in which the disclosure is a document, such as a 
doctoral thesis, courts often analyze public accessibility by looking to 
see if the disclosure was catalogued in “a meaningful way” in a public 
 
 32. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the claimed 
invention was . . . available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention . . . .”). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 100(i)(1).  
 34. For a list of the statutorily enumerated categories of prior art, see supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. Notably, this list is nonexclusive. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b). 
 35. Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 37. 
 36. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1359 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 224  
(C.C.P.A. 1981).  
 37. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys. Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 38. See NARD, supra note 17, at 292. 
 39. In many cases where a reference is found to be a printed publication, the circumstances 
indicate that it is extremely unlikely that a PHOSITA would have located the disclosure. See, e.g., 
Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of petition to hear en banc): 
It is undisputed that these cancelled drawings are not available in any database or any 
library, and that no index, no catalog, no abstract suggests their existence or their 
content. . . . [T]he only way to obtain these drawings (although their existence was 
unknown) is to personally go to the Canadian Patent Office in Hull, Quebec, and ask to 
examine the file wrapper . . . of this particular patent . . . .; 
see also In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897–98, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single thesis deposited 
in one German library and indexed in a special dissertations catalogue was “sufficient[ly] 
accessibil[e] to those interested in the art exercising reasonable diligence”). 
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archive.40 For disclosures that are not printed publications in the 
traditional sense, like a poster presentation, the Federal Circuit has 
outlined several factors for analyzing whether disclosure was publicly 
accessible: the length of time of the display,41 the expertise of the target 
audience,42 the existence of reasonable expectations that the display 
would not be copied,43 and the ease with which the display could have 
been copied.44  
For online publications, courts will examine both the indexing of 
the disclosure and the circumstances surrounding the disclosure to 
determine if it was publicly accessible.45 For example, in Voter Verified, 
Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that 
an unindexed internet article was still publicly available prior art.46 The 
court determined that the article’s availability on a well-known website 
dedicated to the invention’s technology field made it publicly accessible 
despite it not being indexed in a search engine.47 Thus, for online 
publications, indexing is “a relevant factor” but not “a necessary 
condition” for an online reference to be publicly available, and courts 
will consider other factors.48 
2. The Substantive Requirements 
To be a patentability-defeating prior art reference under § 102, 
a prior art reference must meet two substantive requirements. First, 
there must be strict identity between the now-claimed invention and 
the invention disclosed in the prior art reference, and second, the prior 
 
 40. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that student theses indexed 
alphabetically by authors name were not sufficiently accessible because indexing bore no 
relationship to the subject of the theses). But see In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1314–16 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (holding that databases searchable by keyword, but not databases only searchable by 
authors name or first word of the title, were publicly accessible for the contained disclosures to 
constitute printed publications); In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 897–98, 900 (holding that a single thesis 
deposited indexed in a special catalogue in one German library was sufficiently accessible). 
 41. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Howmedica, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 846, 860 (D.N.J. 
1981) (holding that a limited duration slide presentation did not allow a PHOSITA to make or use 
the invention and thus the presentation was not prior art). 
 42. See Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813–14 (2d Cir. 1928) (stating that a reference may 
be a printed publication if it “goes direct to those whose interests make them likely to observe and 
remember whatever it may contain that is new and useful”). 
 43. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Where professional and 
behavioral norms entitle a party to a reasonable expectation that the information displayed will 
not be copied, [a court] is more reluctant to find something a ‘printed publication.’ ”). 
 44. See id. (“The more complex a display, the more difficult it will be for members of the public 
to effectively capture its information.”). 
 45. Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 37. 
 46. 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 47. Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 37. 
 48. Voter Verified, 698 F.3d at 1380. 
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art reference must satisfy the anticipatory enablement requirement.49 
Strict identity requires a single prior art reference disclose every 
limitation50 of the claimed invention, arranged as in the claims of the 
patent application at issue.51 But the reference need not expressly 
disclose every limitation of the invention. The inherent anticipation 
doctrine softens the strict identity requirement by allowing “a prior art 
reference [to] anticipate [a claimed invention] without disclosing [every 
limitation] of the claimed invention if the missing [limitation] is 
necessarily present . . . in the single [prior art] reference.”52 A limitation 
is necessarily present in a prior art reference if it naturally flows from 
what the reference explicitly discloses.53 Further, although a single 
prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose all limitations, 
an examiner may use secondary references to show that the missing 
 
 49. Seymore, supra note 12, at 931. 
 50. A limitation is any component or part of an invention that the patentee claims as part of 
the invention in a patent application. See Andrew Schulman, Patent Litigation Part Three: An 
Introduction to Patent Claims, “Limitations,” Infringement, and Invalidity, DISPUTESOFT (Dec. 11, 
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.disputesoft.com/patent-litigation-part-three-an-introduction-to-
patent-claims-limitations-infringement-and-invalidity/#:~:text=Patent%20claims%20are% 
20made%20up,a%20wide%20scope%20of%20infringement [https://perma.cc/W9DH-EETX]. A 
patentee may claim a limitation in physical or functional form. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (allowing for 
functional claim limitations). For example, a patentee applying for a patent on a new coffee mug 
might claim the limitation that the coffee mug “has a C-shaped handle” (physical limitation)  
or might claim the limitation that the coffee mug has “means for holding the coffee mug”  
(functional limitation). 
 51. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed 
invention arranged as in the claim.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). For example, an inventor applies for a patent claiming a chair with the 
limitations or elements of a square seat, four legs attached at the corners of the seat, and a seat 
back. If the examiner finds a published book describing a chair with a square seat, four legs 
attached at the corners of the seat, and a seatback arranged as in the inventor’s patent application, 
the book satisfies the strict identity requirement. However, if the book describes a chair having a 
round seat, having only three legs, or not having a seatback, the book would not satisfy the strict 
identity requirement because it failed to disclose each limitation of the claimed invention. Further, 
if the book described a chair with a square seat, four legs, and a seatback, but the legs were not 
attached at the corners of the seat portion, the chair would fail the strict identity requirement 
because the legs would not be arranged as in the claimed invention. 
 52. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also 
NARD, supra note 17, at 254 (articulating the test for inherent anticipation to be that “a claim 
limitation is inherently anticipated if the limitation is necessarily present in or inevitably flows 
from the reference; or, if the reference is an actual device, the claim limitation would necessarily 
result from the use of the device for its intended purpose”). 
 53. Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1379. For example, if an invention was described as “a 
container having a cap and a body that is waterproof when the cap is secured to the body” it would 
naturally flow from the explicit disclosure that a seal exists between the cap and the body. This 
seal is inherently present despite not being explicitly described. 
        
2021] USING AI TO MASS PRODUCE PRIOR ART 531 
feature was inherently present in a single prior art reference.54 Thus, 
the strict identity requirement is not so strict in application. 
Second, a reference or disclosure must meet the anticipatory 
enablement requirement to be prior art under § 102. Under the 
anticipatory enablement requirement, to be prior art, a disclosure must 
provide enough knowledge or information to enable a person having 
ordinary skill in the art (a “PHOSITA”) to make the described invention 
without undue experimentation.55 The anticipatory reference need only 
enable a single embodiment of an invention that falls within the  
scope of the patent claims in the patent-at-issue to satisfy this 
requirement though.56   
Requiring that a piece of prior art “enable” rather than “teach” 
a PHOSITA to make an invention means that the anticipating reference 
does not, by itself, have to “explain every detail” because a PHOSITA’s 
knowledge can fill in the gaps in a disclosure.57 Examiners can use 
secondary references to show what is within the PHOSITA’s 
knowledge.58 Further, whether a prior art reference is enabling is 
determined as of the filing date of the application at issue.59 Thus, even 
if a secondary reference arose after a reference or disclosure was made 
but before the filing date of the patent-at-issue, an examiner can use 
that secondary reference to show that the primary reference was 
enabling.60 Therefore, a reference that was not enabling upon 
publication may become enabling years later.61  
The anticipatory enablement requirement’s ability to filter out 
substandard prior art is further diminished because examiners can 
presume that prior art references are enabling.62 This means that an 
 
 54. See Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To 
serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, 
such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence.”). 
 55. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re 
Omeprazole Pat. Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 56. Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1381. 
 57. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 58. See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (holding that secondary references could be used 
to show that a primary reference was enabling); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosure 
and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2016) (“Non-prior art references can be useful to inform 
the background state of the PHOSITA’s knowledge.”). 
 59. See Holbrook, supra note 58, at 1471 (“Novelty under the AIA is assessed as of the  
filing date.”). 
 60. See id. at 1477 (“[Secondary] references may arise after the prior art reference, so long as 
they are prior to or contemporaneous with the appropriate date for assessing novelty  
(or obviousness).”). 
 61. See id. at 1470 (“The time gap between a prior art disclosure and the validity assessment 
means that the knowledge of the PHOSITA has an opportunity to grow.”). 
 62. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re 
Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (citing In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1963)). 
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examiner can reject an applicant’s claim to an invention without 
inquiring into whether the anticipating reference is enabling.63 Thus, 
examiners can make a prima facie case of anticipation so long as the 
reference satisfies the strict identity requirement.64 The burden then 
shifts to the applicant to rebut the presumption of enablement by a 
preponderance of the evidence.65 If the applicant succeeds, the examiner 
can submit additional evidence to show the prior art reference is 
enabling.66 While the examiner has the ultimate burden of persuasion,67 
this burden-shifting may continue as each side submits new evidence.68 
Notably, a prior art reference needs to satisfy these substantive 
requirements only if it is supporting a rejection under § 102 for lack of 
novelty.69 An examiner may assert a prior art reference to render a 
patent obvious without it meeting the strict identity70 or enablement 
requirements for rejections based on a lack of nonobviousness under 35 
U.S.C. § 103.71 For the purposes of the nonobviousness requirement, 
“[e]ven if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for 
all that it teaches.”72  
C. Ensuring the Patent Bargain 
To minimize the “abhorrence”73 of granting a monopoly, there 
are several statutory requirements a patentee must satisfy before 
 
 63. Amgen Inc., 314 F.3d at 1355. 
 64. See In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 451 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[A] prima facie case is made out 
whenever a reference is shown to contain a disclosure which is specific as to every critical element 
of the appealed claims.”). 
 65. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681 (citing In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d at 746). 
 66. Id. (citing In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). 
 67. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“[T]he primary responsibility for 
sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office.”). 
 68. See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681–82 (explaining how the burden shifted from the PTO, to 
the applicant, back to the PTO, and to the applicant once more). 
 69. The patentability standards of § 102 and § 103 are discussed below in Section C. Ensuring 
the Patent Bargain. 
 70. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, 
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 
102 . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 71. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 748 F.2d 645, 652 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (stating, after finding a reference was nonenabled to be prior art under § 102, that it “may 
qualify as a prior art reference under § 103, but only for what is disclosed in it.”) (emphasis 
omitted). This does not mean that an invention that would otherwise be novelty defeating if it were 
enabling can be the sole prior art reference of an obviousness rejection. See Seymore, supra note 
12, at 939–940 n.104 (“[A]n examiner cannot rely on § 103 to circumvent the requirement for 
enabling prior art. . . . But the prior art as a whole must be enabling, not just a single reference.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 72. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 73. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). 
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receiving a patent to ensure the public receives the full benefit of the 
patent bargain. These standards include novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102),74 
nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103),75 and the disclosure requirements (35 
U.S.C. § 112).76 While not the only requirements, these present the 
greatest implications for large-scale AI-generated prior art. 
1. An Invention Must Be Novel 
It is a foundational principle of patent law that only truly novel 
inventions—inventions that are not already known, made, sold or 
used—are patentable.77 From the utilitarian perspective, if an 
invention is already known to the public, then “the public have acquired 
nothing from the [disclosure] of the patentee[] which they did not 
possess before,” and thus, there is no quid pro quo that justifies the 
grant of a patent.78 Granting a patent for an invention that lacks 
novelty would actually harm the public by removing existing knowledge 
from the public domain.79 
A court or examiner will determine whether an invention is new 
by comparing the invention to the prior art to see if the invention 
already exists.80 If the invention already exists, the invention is not 
novel and is “anticipated” by the prior art.81 As stated above, an 
examiner must find strict identity between the claimed invention and 
an enabling prior art reference to issue a novelty rejection.82  
 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 75. Id. § 103. 
 76. Id. § 112. 
 77. See Cridlebaugh v. Rudolph, 131 F.2d 795, 800 (3d Cir. 1942) (stating that the absence of 
novelty automatically precludes patentability); Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining that 
congressional authorization for patents that would remove technology from the public domain 
would be unconstitutional). 
 78. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES § 292 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1854). Unlike in copyright law, 
an inventor cannot obtain protection for an invention that is in the public domain, even if he 
independently created an invention. Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute 
Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 20 (2016). 
 79. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (“[P]atent protection [for] 
knowledge that is already available to the public . . . would not only serve no socially useful 
purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed 
invention arranged as in the claim.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). See also supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing relevant examples). 
 81. See NARD, supra note 17, at 246 (“The novelty requirement asks whether the claimed 
invention is new. If an invention is not new, it is said to be anticipated by the prior art.”).  
 82. See supra Section I.B.2.  
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2. The Nonobviousness Requirement:  
An Invention Must Be Significant 
Patents are also not granted for inventions that would have been 
obvious to a PHOSITA as of the application filing date.83 While the 
novelty requirement ensures that claimed inventions do not already 
exist in the prior art, the nonobviousness requirement ensures that 
patented inventions are a sufficient improvement over the prior art to 
justify the grant of a patent.84 The rationale for not granting patents on 
obvious inventions is that these inventions would likely come to be 
without the incentive of patent protection.85 Thus, granting patents on 
obvious inventions would not actually promote technological progress.  
Similar to the novelty requirement, an examiner will determine 
if an invention is obvious by comparing the invention to the prior art. 
If, in the examiner’s judgement, the invention is not a significant 
improvement over the prior art, the examiner will reject the invention 
as obvious. Importantly, the nonobviousness requirement is more 
rigorous than the novelty requirement for several reasons. First, 
multiple prior art references may combine to support an obviousness 
rejection, so even if a particular invention has not yet been made and is 
unknown, it may still be unpatentable if it is an insignificant change 
over the prior art.86 Second, obviousness is judged as of the application 
filing date.87 Thus, an invention that is not obvious the day it is made 
may become obvious as technology advances between the time when the 
invention is made and the filing of the patent application.88 Third, an 
examiner determines nonobviousness from the perspective of the 
PHOSITA, while presuming that a PHOSITA has knowledge of all 
analogous prior art89 and can combine prior art references with 
 
 83. 35 U.S.C. § 103.  
 84. NARD, supra note 17, at 329; see also United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) 
(“[N]ovelty and nonobviousness . . . are separate tests of patentability and all must be satisfied in 
a valid patent.”). 
 85. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 155 (2011) (stating 
that “[a]n obvious invention will likely soon be made even without the award of a patent right”). 
 86. NARD, supra note 17, at 351; see also supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text 
(discussing the strict identity requirement). 
 87. Holbrook, supra note 58, at 1472. 
 88. See id. at 1470 (“The time gap between a prior art disclosure and the validity assessment 
means that the knowledge of the PHOSITA has an opportunity to grow.”). 
 89. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (“The person of ordinary skill [for purposes of determining obviousness] is a hypothetical 
person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”). Analogous Prior Art is prior 
art that comes from the same field of endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem 
the invention addresses. NARD, supra note 17, at 401. 
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ordinary creativity.90 This allows the examiner some discretion in 
determining whether an invention is obvious. Thus, the nonobviousness 
requirement is often the biggest hurdle for obtaining a patent.91 
3. Disclosing the Invention 
Those seeking patent protection in the United States must also 
satisfy the three disclosure requirements: (1) written description, (2) 
enablement, and (3) best mode.92 The written description requirement 
ensures that the scope of patent protection is proportional to the scope 
of what the patentee disclosed in the application.93 To satisfy the 
written description requirement, the patentee must describe the 
invention in enough detail to establish that the patentee possessed the 
invention as of the application filing date.94 A written description that 
merely renders the invention obvious is insufficient to satisfy the 
written description requirement.95 The corollary to this statement, 
discussed below,96 is that a prior art disclosure may render an invention 
 
 90. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also 
a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). 
 91. Lack of nonobviousness rejections are the most common rejection at the USPTO. Katrina 
Brundage & James Cosgrove, Section 103 Rejections: How Common Are They and How Should You 
Respond?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/10/03/103-rejections-
common-respond/id=73214/ [https://perma.cc/YL5D-PQEF]. 
 92. These statutory disclosure requirements appear in the first paragraph of § 112: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated 
by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). While the best mode requirement still exists in § 112 under the AIA, it is no 
longer a ground for invalidating a granted patent. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose 
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 552 (2012). For this reason, the best mode 
requirement has only minor implications for the large-scale AI-generated prior art and is not 
analyzed in this Note. 
 93. NARD, supra note 17, at 138–39.  
 94. Id. at 551; Holbrook, supra note 20, at 127. However, in a patent law context, possession 
does not mean physical possession because the thing being possessed is the intangible idea of the 
invention. Id. at 146. Courts have repeatedly stated that actual possession or reduction to practice, 
by building a working prototype, is neither necessary nor sufficient for satisfying the written 
description requirement. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (en 
banc). Rather, the specification itself must show that the inventor possessed the invention as of 
the filing date. Id. at 1351–52 (characterizing written description requirement as “possession as 
shown in the disclosure”). Practically, this means that the patentee must describe the invention 
and not merely the result the invention produces to satisfy the written description requirement. 
Id. at 1350 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 95. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 96. See infra Section II.B (discussing how prior art may be insufficient to meet the written 
description requirement itself, while still barring patentability for a claimed invention). 
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obvious without itself satisfying the written description requirement  
for patentability.97 
While the written description requirement compels patentees to 
describe what the invention is, the enablement requirement compels 
patentees to describe how to make and use the invention.98 The 
statutory, or patent-supporting,99 enablement requirement of § 112 is 
“arguably the most important patent doctrine after obviousness”100 and 
is a separate requirement from the written description requirement.101 
Enablement ensures that the invention enters the public domain when 
the patent expires.102 Like the written description requirement, the 
enablement requirement also serves to limit the scope of patent 
protection to what the inventor actually teaches in the patent.103  
The statutory enablement requirement demands that the 
specification of the patent “enable any person skilled in the art . . . to 
make and use the [invention].”104 An examiner can reject a patent 
application if it fails to teach a PHOSITA either how to make the 
invention or how to use the invention.105 Thus, statutory enablement is 
 
 97. Cf. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 (stating that a description that “merely renders the invention 
obvious does not satisfy the requirement”). 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring a written description of the invention and “of the manner 
and process of making and using it”). Although found in the same paragraph, these requirements 
are doctrinally separate. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344. 
 99. This Note refers to the enablement requirement of § 112 as statutory or patent-
supporting enablement, in contrast to anticipatory or patent-defeating enablement discussed in 
Section I.C.2.   
 100. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). To illustrate the difference between written 
description and enablement, the court in In re DiLeone provided an example of a disclosure that 
would satisfy the enablement requirement but not the written description requirement: “consider 
the case where the specification discusses only compound A and contains no broadening language 
of any kind. This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and 
C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has not been described.” 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 
1971). On the other hand, it is easier to see how an application could satisfy the written description 
requirement, while failing the enablement requirement. See, e.g., In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 
1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that enablement requirement of § 112 was not satisfied because the 
disclosure did not teach how to use the invention, although it fully described the invention). 
 101. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344.  
 102. Holbrook, supra note 20, at 128. 
 103. The scope of the claimed invention in a patent must fall within scope of enablement. Id. 
at 157–58; see also Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification 
plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue 
experimentation.”). The specification is the part of the patent where the inventor describes the 
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (emphasis added). 
 105. See In re Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405 (holding that the requirements of § 112 were not met 
because the “how to use” requirement was not satisfied, “though the manner of ‘making,’ as 
distinguished from ‘using,’ the invention [was] also fully disclosed”); see also Holbrook, supra note 
20, at 127 (noting that the specification must disclose how to make and use the invention). The 
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a more stringent requirement than anticipatory enablement, which 
applies to prior art, because anticipatory enablement requires only that 
a reference enable a PHOSITA to make the described invention to be 
prior art.106  
The level of teaching that a patent application must provide to 
be enabling is the level sufficient to allow a PHOSITA to make and use 
the claimed invention without undue experimentation.107 The 
enablement analysis, like the nonobviousness analysis, is complex 
because it is performed from the perspective of the PHOSITA.108 Thus, 
a patentee can use extrinsic evidence to show what was within the 
PHOSITA’s knowledge, 109 which may change over time.110  
Further, a reference need only enable a single embodiment of an 
invention that falls within the scope of the patent-at-issue to support a 
novelty rejection;111 whereas, statutory enablement requires a patent 
application to enable the full scope of the claimed subject matter.112 
“These differing standards reveal a curious asymmetry”113 that “a 
disclosure [may be] entirely adequate to anticipate [an 
invention] . . . and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the 
 
“use” component can be a crucial distinction for chemical inventions because an inventor cannot 
obtain a patent on a chemical compound if there is no known use, even if the inventor invents the 
compound and method for making it. Holbrook, supra note 20, at 129. 
 106. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405 (“[Section] 112 provides that the specification must enable 
one skilled in the art to ‘use’ the invention whereas § 102 makes no such requirement as to an 
anticipatory disclosure.”). 
 107. NARD, supra note 17, at 116 (emphasis added). Courts thus recognize that some 
experimentation may be necessary to practice an invention, but a patent is only nonenabling when 
the experimentation becomes undue. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 
F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“That some experimentation is necessary does not preclude 
enablement; the amount of experimentation, however, must not be unduly extensive.”).  
Courts have identified several factors for determining when experimentation is undue. These  
factors include: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance 
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the 
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the 
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.  
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 108. For a deeper discussion of the implications of analyzing enablement from the perspective 
of the PHOSITA, see supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 109. See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (holding that secondary 
references could show enablement). 
 110. See Holbrook, supra note 58, at 1468 (“[I]t is conceivable that a prior art reference that 
was not enabled as of its effective prior art date could become enabled over time as the knowledge 
of the PHOSITA expands.”). 
 111. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 112. Compare Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he full scope [of the claimed invention] must be enabled . . . .”), with AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 
344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he applicant’s specification must enable one of ordinary 
skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.”). 
 113. Seymore, supra note 12, at 933. 
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[issuance of a patent on the invention].”114 As discussed below, AI-
generated disclosures exploit these different standards to preempt 
patent protection for desirable inventions and thus inhibit the 
disclosure of knowledge that such patents provide, without providing 
society with an adequate substitute disclosure.115 
D. The Current State of AI-Generated Prior Art 
Currently, there are several entities using brute-force 
computing power to algorithmically generate disclosures that cover 
potentially novel inventions.116 Some entities, like the company Cloem, 
market AI-generated prior art as a service to other organizations for 
competitive purposes, such as preempting the patents of competitors 
and creating freedom to operate around the organization’s own 
patents.117 Other organizations, like All Prior Art (“APA”), altruistically 
use AI-generated prior art “to democratize ideas, provide an impetus for 
change in the patent system, and to preempt patent trolls.”118  
Although the current entities trying to use artificial intelligence 
to generate prior art have diverse purposes, the underlying AI 
technologies that produce the disclosures have several similarities.119 
First, these technologies use “linguistic manipulation” to alter text from 
existing patents into disclosures covering potentially novel 
inventions.120 AI performs this linguistic manipulation using 
grammatical algorithms and technical lexicons to create a description 
 
 114. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 115. See infra Section II.B.  
 116. The two entities primarily focused on in this article are Cloems and All Prior Art.  
 117. See Benefits, supra note 6 (explaining the offensive and defensive competitive benefits of 
using Cloem services). 
 118. About, supra note 6. A patent troll, or nonpracticing entity, is an entity that 
commercializes its patent portfolio by licensing its patents to others rather than practicing the 
inventions contained in the patents. J. Jason Williams, Mark V. Campagna & Olivia E. Marbutt, 
Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368 n.1 (2010). 
 119. See Felix Hamborg, Moustafa Elmaghraby, Corinna Breitinger & Bela Gipp, Automated 
Generation of Timestamped Patent Abstracts at Scale to Outsmart Patent-Trolls, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 2ND JOINT WORKSHOP ON BIBLIOMETRIC-ENHANCED INFORMATION RETRIEVAL AND 
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING FOR DIGITAL LIBRARIES 101, 102 (Philipp Mayr, Muthu Kumar 
Chandrasekaran & Kokil Jaidka eds., 2017) (describing the similarities and common shortcomings 
of All Prior Art, Cloem, and Transform Any Text into a Patent Application). 
 120. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 35–36 (describing the creation of AI-generated 
disclosures from existing patent claim language through linguistic manipulation). 
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of the physical structure.121 These technologies then timestamp and 
publish the disclosures online.122  
It is important to see how these AI technologies produce the 
disclosures in contrast to how a human would write such disclosure. A 
human would first conceive of an idea and would then reduce that idea 
into words on a page. In contrast, these AI technologies start with words 
on a page. They then use linguistic manipulation to create the final 
product—more words on a page. The critical difference is that the AI 
never converts the description into anything more than words on a 
page. In a sense, the AI creates a description of an invention without 
actually “thinking” about the idea or structure it is describing. This 
drastically reduces the quality of these AI-generated disclosures. 
AI technologies have several other limitations. First, the 
technologies are only effective at producing disclosures in certain 
technical fields. Cloem’s technology works best with software and 
mechanical inventions123 while APA generates disclosures on data 
processing systems.124 Further, the generated disclosures are not 
syntactically diverse from the base patent language that the 
technologies use.125 Lastly, these technologies mostly produce 
nonsensical,126 although grammatically correct, disclosures.127 Thus, 
these technologies must produce millions of nonsensical disclosures to 
 
 121. Features, CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/features/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/3EW6-NP8Y] (discussing the algorithms and specialized dictionaries that Cloem 
uses to create texts). For example, one APA disclosure reads: 
A wearable electric device includes a main body with a circuit module inside and at 
least a detachable battery strap with a battery module inside, and the main body and 
the detachable battery strap are detachably fastened together. The test device includes 
an addressable memory. . . . Each of the strips is radially offset from one another. In 
the sealing step, long side edges of the battery case are crimped by a forming surface 
having a rounded cross section, and arc-shaped edges connecting both long side edges 
are crimped by a flat forming surface. 
Prior Art, ALL PRIOR ART, http://allpriorart.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
4SH8-4ST]. 
 122. See Features, supra note 121 (describing timestamping technology); About, supra note  
6 (same). 
 123. F.A.Q., CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/faq/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/S32L-FLVE]. 
 124. Hamborg et al., supra note 119, at 102. 
 125. See id. (stating that the linguistic manipulation techniques of Cloem and APA are not 
syntactically diverse). 
 126. For an example of the nonsensical nature of the claims produced by these technologies 
see supra note 121. These claims sound technologically complex and are grammatically correct but 
make little sense when one tries to convert the words into a real-world item. Importantly, even if 
it would be possible to make the invention described, it is even more difficult to see what the use 
or benefit of such invention would be. 
 127. About, supra note 6; F.A.Q., supra note 123.  
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generate a few meaningful disclosures.128 In the near future, though, 
the technology for producing AI-generated disclosures will likely 
overcome these limitations. 
E. The Strategy of Strategic Disclosure 
Although AI-generated prior art is revolutionary, publishing 
technical information to intentionally create prior art is not a new 
concept.129 Many companies publish, or strategically disclose, technical 
information to prevent rivals from obtaining patents.130 Although this 
may be socially detrimental if companies merely retain trade secrets 
while preventing rivals from obtaining patents,131 strategic disclosure 
is beneficial when it expands the domain of public knowledge without 
the burden of a patent monopoly.132 Therefore, this Note advocates  
for a solution that differentiates between current socially  
beneficial strategic disclosures and socially harmful AI-generated 
strategic disclosures. 
II. THE AVAILABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF  
AI-GENERATED PRIOR ART  
As discussed above, patent law has requirements that a 
patentability-defeating prior art reference must meet, although the 
requirements for what a patent application must disclose are more 
stringent. This Section analyzes why the patent law doctrines discussed 
above are incapable of preventing AI-generated disclosures from 
rendering some societally beneficial inventions unpatentable. Without 
intervention, AI-generated disclosures will stifle the progress of science 
 
 128. See About, supra note 6 (asserting that producing millions of these texts increases the 
odds of creating potential prior art); F.A.Q., supra note 123 (stating that Cloem produces 
thousands of AI-generated patent claims at a time). 
 129. See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48  
J.L. & ECON. 173, 173–77 (2005) (discussing the methods and purposes of large-scale  
“targeted” disclosures). 
 130. There are companies, such as IP.com and Research Disclosure, that exist specifically to 
provide strategic disclosure as a service to other companies. Id. at 173. Other companies, such as 
IBM and Xerox, published their own technical journals to prevent other competitors from pursuing 
patents in the field of their technology. Id. at 174. 
 131. See id. at 176 (discussing how firms might use strategic disclosure to disclose enough 
information to thwart patents for rivals while retaining the rest of its research as a trade secret). 
 132. Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2199–200 (2000). Indeed, these strategic disclosures often reveal valuable 
information, as the PTO has cited thousands of strategic disclosure publications as prior art in 
granted patents. See Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 129, at 174 (finding that granted patents have 
cited strategic disclosure publications over fifty thousand times). 
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because it does not provide an adequate replacement for the knowledge 
contained in patent applications or traditional strategic disclosures. 
A. Scrutinizing AI-Generated Disclosures Under  
the Prior Art Requirements 
A court would probably not consider existing AI-generated 
disclosures to be prior art because the disclosures are insufficiently 
accessible to the public. Additionally, the strict identity requirement 
also poses a barrier for AI-generated disclosures to render some 
inventions unpatentable under the novelty requirement. But even if AI-
generated disclosures rarely meet the strict identity requirement, they 
may still affect the patent system by supporting obviousness rejections. 
Further, minor technological leaps may overcome the current 
inadequacies of AI in producing prior art.  
1. Capturing Knowledge from AI-Generated Disclosures  
In determining whether an AI-generated disclosure satisfies the 
practical requirements for being patentability-defeating prior art, a 
court or examiner would most likely classify these disclosures into the 
“printed publications” category of prior art under § 102(a).133 For a 
reference to be a printed publication, a court will evaluate whether the 
document was publicly accessible by analyzing whether an interested 
PHOSITA exercising reasonable diligence could locate it.134 Although 
current AI-generated disclosures are available on the internet, they are 
unlikely to possess the requisite indexing or context that courts have 
examined when determining whether a disclosure was publicly 
accessible.135 For example, APA produces vastly unrelated “inventions” 
without organizing them by subject matter or in any other “meaningful 
way.”136 Yet unlike many “printed publication” cases,137 APA 
disclosures are searchable by keyword because they are indexed  
 
 133. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 134. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 135. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text (discussing public accessibility). 
 136. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Publications, ALL PRIOR ART, 
http://allpriorart.com/publications/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A72Y-XR5K]. For 
example, one volume of the all prior art disclosures displays consecutively inventions for “A 
monobloc piston assembly,” “[a]n input display apparatus,” and “a process for reducing the level of 
pollutants in the exhaust of a diesel engine” consecutively. Alexander Reben, Volume 1, ALL PRIOR 
ART, https://ia800402.us.archive.org/6/items/AllPriorArt/AllPriorArt-Vol1.txt (last visited Dec. 17, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/BG7P-RAJP]. 
 137. See, e.g., Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161 (finding that student theses indexed alphabetically by 
authors name were not sufficiently accessible because indexing bore no relationship to the subject 
of the theses). 
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in a search engine.138 The court in In re Lister held that  
searchability by keyword was enough to make disclosures in a database  
printed publications.139   
But the database in In re Lister did not contain any nonsensical 
entries like APA and Cloem disclosures do.140 Thus, one interested in 
the art would have to exercise the incremental degree of diligence 
required to filter through nonsensical disclosures when searching for 
prior art in APA or Cloem databases. It is possible a court may view 
this incremental level of diligence as beyond that of an interested 
PHOSITA exercising reasonable diligence.141  
Regardless, indexing is only “a relevant factor” for online 
publications to be publicly accessible, not “a necessary condition.”142 An 
examiner would likely consider other factors.143 For online disclosures 
like APA and Cloems, there is no expectation of privacy, and the 
disclosures remain online for an extended period of time—both factors 
that weigh in favor of the disclosures being printed publications.144 On 
the other hand, it is questionable whether the nature of Cloem and APA 
disclosures allows for easy copying by those who view them.145 Because 
the Cloem and APA disclosures contain nonsensical text, it is more 
difficult for a person interested in the art to copy, or “effectively 
capture,” 146 the actual knowledge contained in the disclosures. 
 Examiners would probably also consider the location of AI-
generated disclosures, just as the court in Voter Verified considered that 
the disclosure at issue was located on a website specific to the 
technology area of the invention and well-known to those in the 
 
 138. See What Is Search Engine Indexing?, BRICK MKTG. , https://www.brickmarketing.com/ 
define-search-engine-index.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/RR3A-PRYH] (“It is 
the search engine index that provides the results for search queries . . . .”). 
 139. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1314–17 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 140. See About, supra note 6; F.A.Q., supra note 123. The database in In re Lister was a 
copyright office database. 583 F.3d at 1310. 
 141. Courts are often reluctant to consider the actual effort required to find a reference when 
determining if a reference was publicly accessible. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 142. Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 143. Although the “printed publication” in Klopfenstein was a printed publication, it is likely 
that a factfinder would still find these factors relevant in deciding whether a disclosure was 
publicly accessible. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For a discussion of 
other factors that courts will consider when deciding if a nontraditional publication is publicly 
accessible, see supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text (discussing factors in whether non-
traditional publication is publicly accessible). 
 145. Copying in this instance does not mean literal copying but rather the ability to take and 
practice the information contained. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351. (“The more complex 
a display, the more difficult it will be for members of the public to effectively capture  
its information.”). 
 146. Id. 
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industry.147 While APA and Cloems generate disclosures only for 
mechanical, electrical, and data-processing inventions,148 these fields 
are broader than the field—electronic voting technologies—identified 
by the court in Voter Verified.149 The broad field of inventions covered 
and the volumes of unorganized, nonsensical inventions in collections 
of AI-generated disclosures make it unlikely that workers in any 
industry would use or value Cloem or APA databases as technical 
resources. Thus, even “those interested in the art exercising reasonable 
diligence” would have no reason to look for prior art within the 
databases of current AI-generated disclosures.150 
The recurring issue with current AI-generated disclosures is 
that the few valuable disclosures are dispersed among volumes of 
nonsensical texts. This makes it difficult to index the inventions by 
subject matter because it is impossible to categorize a nonsensical 
invention. The amount of nonsensical ideas would also undermine the 
legitimacy of AI-generated disclosures as a resource for industry 
experts.151 Thus, a person interested in finding such information would 
either choose not to, or would have to put forth an unreasonable  
amount of effort to, search through existing collections of AI- 
generated disclosures. 
Looking forward, technological advancements will likely 
overcome the issues plaguing current AI-generated disclosures. 
Revolutionary deep-learning techniques now allow computers to 
imitate human creativity.152 If Cloems and APA utilized these 
technologies, the quality of their disclosures would increase. Because 
both Cloems and APA publish their disclosures with the intent that 
they will constitute patentability-defeating prior art references,153 these 
organizations have incentive to develop more advanced AI. 
Additionally, as computing power increases,154 AI-generated 
disclosures will become more plentiful, which will result in more AI-
generated disclosures of value. Researchers have estimated that merely 
 
 147. 698 F.3d at 1380.  
 148. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (discussing Cloem and APA and the kind 
of disclosures generated). 
 149. 698 F.3d at 1380. 
 150. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 151. For an example and discussion of the nonsensical nature of these AI-generated 
disclosures, see supra notes 121, 127. 
 152. See Nina I. Brown, Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated 
Works, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2018) (defining deep learning and explaining how 
it surpasses traditional AI-coding methods). 
 153. See supra Section I.D (discussing the current state of AI-generated prior art). 
 154. Mike Murphy, As Moore’s Law Turns 50, Computer Chips Continue to Get Cheaper and 
More Powerful, QUARTZ (Apr. 21, 2015), https://qz.com/387490/as-moores-law-turns-50-computer-
chips-continue-to-get-cheaper-and-more-powerful/ [https://perma.cc/PUQ4-9QU8].  
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improving linguistic manipulation techniques could bring the quality of 
current AI-generated disclosures twenty percent closer to the quality of 
actual patents.155 Thus, AI-generated disclosures will likely soon meet 
the current standards for prior art. 
2. Enablement Troubles 
Some AI-generated disclosures may very well meet the 
anticipatory enablement standard, thus satisfying one of the two 
substantive prior art requirements. Current AI-generated disclosures 
themselves contain very little teaching,156 but the anticipatory 
enablement standard is not enough to prevent these disclosures from 
constituting prior art for three reasons. First, the anticipatory 
enablement standard requires only that a disclosure enable a PHOSITA 
to make the invention.157 Second, a PHOSITA’s knowledge can fill in 
any gaps in a disclosure,158 and third, prior art references are presumed 
enabling.159 These factors create a risk that AI-generated disclosures 
will mistakenly be found enabling.  
The key flaw in the anticipatory enablement requirement that 
would allow AI-generated disclosures to pass as prior art is that it does 
not require a disclosure to enable the PHOSITA to use the described 
invention. Under the current anticipatory enablement standard, AI-
generated disclosures are enabling as long as they describe the 
invention enough to enable a PHOSITA to make the invention.160 But 
because many current disclosure-generating AI technologies use 
linguistic manipulation to only describe a physical structure, these 
technologies are incapable of identifying a use for the invention.161 
These disclosures cannot enable a PHOSITA to use the invention 
 
 155. See Hamborg et al., supra note 119, at 105 (providing survey evidence in table one that 
modified algorithms can increase the quality of AI-generated claim by twenty percent in relation 
to actual patent claims). 
 156. The disclosures of APA are limited to mere recitations of structure. See supra note 121 
(discussing algorithms and dictionaries Cloem uses to create text). 
 157. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipatory  
enablement requirement). 
 158. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that a PHOSITA’s knowledge can 
fill in the gaps in a disclosure). 
 159. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that examiners can presume prior 
art references are enabling). 
 160. See supra notes 55, 106 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipatory  
enablement standard). 
 161. See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (discussing similarities among entities 
using artificial intelligence). The use that a prior art reference would need to identify would likely 
need to be a specific and substantial use, as 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 
1365, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining specific utility as not “so general as to be meaningless” 
and a substantial utility as “significant and presently available benefit to the public”). 
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because the AI cannot teach what it cannot identify.162 Thus, if the 
anticipatory enablement standard required a disclosure to enable the 
PHOSITA to use an invention, an examiner would likely find current 
AI-generated disclosures do not qualify as prior art.  
There is actually an increased likelihood that AI-generated 
disclosures will meet the anticipatory enablement requirement, 
however, because current disclosure-generating AI produces 
disclosures only in certain technology fields, like the mechanical and 
electrical fields.163 These fields are predictable and require less teaching 
to be enabling because a PHOSITA can more easily fill any gaps in the 
disclosure using his own knowledge.164 The knowledge of a PHOSITA 
can be shown using secondary references, such as the patents that serve 
as the base language for current AI-generated disclosures.165 Since AI-
generated disclosures are likely just variations of the original patent 
language, the original patent may contain evidence of the PHOSITA’s 
knowledge and information about how to practice the invention and 
other related inventions.166 Therefore, the original patent could show 
that a PHOSITA could make the invention described in the AI-
generated disclosures.167 
 
 162. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For this reason, examiners often 
issue rejections for utility and enablement together. MPEP § 2164.07 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017,  
Jan. 2017). 
 163. Cloem’s AI technology works best with mechanical and electrical inventions while APA 
claims that they limit their inventions to data processing systems. See supra notes 123–124 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that the requisite disclosure 
to enable an invention in a predictable field, like mechanical or electrical inventions, may require 
less disclosure than is necessary for an invention, such as a “diverse and relatively poorly 
understood group of microorganisms,” which is in an unpredictable field). The scope of enablement 
includes the information in the disclosure and information known to the PHOSITA. Nat’l Recovery 
Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 165. See supra notes 57–58, 120 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipatory 
enablement requirement and creation of disclosures). 
 166. Indeed, a granted patent must teach a PHOSITA how to make and use the invention or 
the patent would not have issued. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain . . . the manner 
and process of making and using [the invention].” (emphasis added)). The court in In re DiLeone 
provided an example of how a patent could enable a PHOSITA to make and use an invention 
without even describing that invention: “Consider the case where the specification discusses only 
compound A and contains no broadening language of any kind. This might very well enable one 
skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has 
not been described.” 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
 167. It is important to note that the original patents themselves could not be what enables the 
AI-generated disclosure but rather could only show what is within the knowledge of the PHOSITA. 
See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (allowing additional references to support 
a § 102 rejection for the sole purpose of showing what would have been known or obvious to  
a PHOSITA). 
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Further, in the Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”), a prior art 
reference receives a presumption of enablement.168 This presents a 
challenge to patentees seeking to disqualify AI-generated disclosures as 
prior art because the patentee must prove what is not within the 
knowledge of the PHOSITA by a preponderance of the evidence.169 Of 
course, the patentee’s failure to meet this standard of proof does not 
mean that the prior art reference is actually enabling, but rather, it 
simply means that the patentee failed or determined it was not worth 
trying to show what a PHOSITA could not do.170 In such cases, the 
presumption of enablement and the burden shifting framework allow 
substandard disclosures to be prior art against a patent application. 
Thus, AI-generated disclosures may defeat the novelty of some 
inventions without themselves enabling a PHOSITA to make and use 
the invention. 
3. Accuracy by Volume: Achieving Strict Identity  
Through Large-Scale Disclosure 
In addition to satisfying the practical requirements and the 
anticipatory enablement requirement, an AI-generated disclosure must 
have strict identity with an invention in order to render the invention 
unpatentable for lack of novelty.171 It may seem unlikely that AI could, 
by happenstance, produce a disclosure that contains every limitation or 
component of a claimed invention arranged as described in the patent 
given the infinite number of components and ways to combine them.172 
Even using specialized algorithms and existing patent text as a starting 
point may not create a high likelihood that a given AI-generated 
disclosure will describe an invention that is later the subject of a patent 
application.173 As a result, entities like APA and Cloem publish millions 
 
 168. See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (stating that the appellant must rebut 
the presumption of enablement once the PTO cites a disclosure). 
 169. Id.; see also LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW 458 (4th ed. 2016) (“Proving a negative is difficult . . . .”). 
 170. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (describing the burden-shifting 
framework). See also Seymore, supra note 12, at 939 (stating that this burden-shifting may 
continue as each side produces new evidence).  
 171. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing the strict  
identity requirement). 
 172. Any current AI-generated disclosures that contain patentable inventions are best 
described as occurring by happenstance because, although disclosure-generating AI uses 
algorithms to increase the likelihood that a disclosure will describe a patentable invention, many 
disclosures do not. See supra notes 120, 127–128 and accompanying text (discussing the large 
quantity of nonsensical disclosures produced by technologies to produce a few meaningful ones). 
 173. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing how technologies  
produce disclosures). 
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of AI-generated disclosures to increase the chance of anticipating  
an invention.174 
Yet large-scale publication of AI-generated disclosures is not the 
only reason there is an increased chance of strict identity occurring 
between AI-generated disclosures and the later claimed inventions. It 
is common for a patent application to claim a broad genus175 that may 
contain thousands or millions of different embodiments within it.176 But 
a prior art disclosure merely needs to describe one of the potentially 
millions of embodiments that falls within a genus claimed in a patent 
application to support a lack of novelty rejection.177 This is because a 
patent cannot cover any invention embodiment that lacks novelty, or it 
would be harming the public by removing knowledge from the public 
domain.178 While patentees may be able to overcome these rejections by 
narrowing the scope of the claim, narrowing claim scope certainly 
reduces the value of the resulting patents because they will offer less 
protection.179 Therefore, it is probable that at least some of the millions 
of AI-generated disclosures will achieve strict identity with inventions 
claimed in patent applications, which in turn will result in narrower 
and less valuable patents issuing.  
4. Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness 
An AI-generated disclosure can support a lack of nonobviousness 
rejection under § 103 even if it cannot support a lack of novelty rejection 
under § 102 because it lacks anticipatory enablement or strict identity. 
Because a factfinder may combine multiple references to form a § 103 
rejection, secondary references can supplement AI-generated 
disclosures that may not contain each and every limitation of an 
invention claimed in a patent application.180 Further, to support a lack 
 
 174. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (explaining that millions of nonsensical 
disclosures are produced and only a few meaningful ones).  
 175. In patent law, a genus is a broad category of inventions that may encompass many specific 
inventions, called species. See Mike Ervin, Genus and Species, BUS. OF PATS., http://www.the-
business-of-patents.com/genus-and-species.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
KF2S-7MKT] (explaining the concepts of genus and species in patent law). For example, the term 
beverage container is a genus that would cover many species such as a mug, cup, bottle, jug, etc. 
 176. See Seymore, supra note 12, at 927 n.38 (discussing how savvy drafters can write broad 
genus claims that cover millions of species and noting one patent in particular that covers over 
one novemdecillion, or 1060 species). 
 177. MPEP § 2131.02(I) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017) (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008 
(Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 178. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 113, 115 (1990) (discussing the relationship between the scope of a patent and the value of 
a patent). 
 180. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing nonobvious requirement). 
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of nonobviousness rejection under § 103, AI-generated disclosures do 
not even have to be enabling as long as “the prior art as a whole [is] 
enabling.”181 Although an AI-generated disclosure would still need to be 
a printed publication to support a § 103 rejection, it would circumvent 
many of the § 102 standards that filter out substandard prior art.182 
The ability of AI-generated disclosures to support 
nonobviousness rejections under § 103 makes it almost certain that 
these disclosures will affect the patentability of some inventions. As put 
forth by Scott Baker and Claudio Mezzetti, the patentability of 
knowledge can be understood using a linear model.183 In this model, the 
amount of knowledge already known to the public is quantified as p and 
the amount of knowledge that an inventor has is quantified as i.184 For 
an inventor to receive a patent on his knowledge, and thus not receive 
a rejection under § 103, his knowledge must exceed the knowledge 
available to the public by an incremental quantity, ∆.185 Thus, to get a 
patent, i must be equal to or greater than p + ∆.186 However, public 
knowledge, p, increases through normal technological advancement.187 
Therefore, inventors have to increase the growth rate of i at a rate 
greater than the growth rate of p to continue to receive patents. 
AI-generated disclosures could increase the growth rate of p and 
therefore increase the growth rate of i required to receive a patent. Even 
if a single AI-generated disclosure increases public knowledge by only 
a trivial amount, the total increase in public knowledge resulting from 
millions of AI-generated disclosures would be anything but trivial. 
Thus, the value of p will be greater in the presence of AI-generated 
disclosures than it would be in its absence. This will inevitably render 
some number of inventions obvious and unpatentable as inventors 
become unable to increase the growth rate of i to keep up with p. Thus, 
inventions that would be patentable in the absence of AI-generated 
 
 181. See Seymore, supra note 12, at 939–40 n.104 (emphasis added) (citing Holbrook, supra 
note 20, at 171–73) (discussing standard and burden of proof in patenting process). This means 
that if multiple references are combined to form an obviousness rejection, no single reference needs 
to be enabling so long as all the references combined would enable a PHOSITA to make the 
invention without undue experimentation. Id. 
 182. MPEP § 2141.01 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017). 
 183. See Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 13, at 179 (discussing how firms can disclose some 
information to thwart rival patents, but also maintain trade secrets).  
 184. See id. (describing the relationship between nonobviousness, disclosure, and public 
knowledge in the context of a two firm patent race). 
 185. See NARD, supra note 17, at 329 (“[Nonobviousness] demands that the claimed invention 
be sufficiently removed from the prior art, meaning in most cases the invention reflects a  
leap forward.”). 
 186. Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 13, at 180. 
 187. See id. (explaining that strategic disclosure “increase[es] p and rais[es] the threshold of 
patentability, p + ∆”). 
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disclosures will increasingly become unpatentable as the value of  
p increases. 
B. Inhibiting the Promotion of the Progress of Science 
 The use of mass-produced, AI-generated prior art will have a 
profound effect on the patent system’s ability to promote the progress 
of science.188 Allowing AI-generated disclosures to serve as prior art will 
increase prosecution and litigation costs and decrease the value of 
patents. As a result, inventors will likely shift to seeking protection 
under less societally beneficial trade secret law, which circumvents 
patent law’s disclosure function.189 Further, the information contained 
in AI-generated disclosures is not an adequate substitute for the 
disclosure in patents.  
First, mass-produced, AI-generated disclosures will increase 
patent prosecution costs by compelling more extensive prior art 
searches. Patentees often conduct prior art searches before filing an 
application to determine if the likelihood of obtaining a patent justifies 
the cost of filing an application.190 Additionally, examiners must 
conduct their own prior art search to determine if an invention is truly 
novel and nonobvious.191 Searching through masses of AI-generated 
disclosures will require more resources to complete a thorough search. 
Patentees will bear these costs directly by paying for their own patent 
searches and indirectly by paying increased patent application fees the 
PTO will use to offset its increased costs.192 Therefore, even though AI-
generated prior art costs next to nothing to produce,193 it creates large 
externalities for patentees that disincentivize inventors from pursuing 
patent protection.  
Further, AI-generated prior art will increase the costs of 
litigating patents because defendants will incur greater costs in 
 
 188. The patent system promotes innovation by both incentivizing new inventions and 
incentivizing the disclosure of inventions, which allows for follow-on innovations and cross-
pollination of ideas. Seymore, supra note 21, at 661. 
 189. See sources cited supra note 13. 
 190. What Is a Prior Art Search, ELLENOFF GROSSMAN & SCHOLE LLP (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://www.egsllp.com/blog/what-is-a-prior-art-search [https://perma.cc/UQ5Z-VK8U].  
 191. MPEP § 704.01 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017). 
 192. The USPTO charges fees to patentees. Thus, if the cost of examining patents increase, 
the USPTO would likely respond by increasing patent application fees and other fees. See U.S. 
Pat. & Trademark Off., Letter to Patent Public Advisory Council Regarding Proposed Patent Fees 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Letter_from_the_Director_ 
to_PPAC.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QDM-3FGH] (“The Office’s costs increase along with inflation, and 
the proposed five percent increase to most patent-related fees will help keep up with rising costs.”). 
 193. See About, supra note 6 (“[T]he cost to computationally create and publish millions of 
ideas is nearly zero . . . .”). 
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searching for and asserting prior art, which plaintiffs will then have to 
defend against.194 One common defense strategy in a patent 
infringement lawsuit is for a defendant to assert that the patent is 
invalid based on prior art.195 To use this defense, a defendant must 
search for prior art that could potentially invalidate the claim.196 These 
searches contribute heavily to the already high costs of patent 
litigation.197 As with patent prosecution, prior art search costs during 
litigation will increase as AI produces masses of prior art, and patent 
litigators may be required to conduct these searches to exercise due 
diligence.198 Further, patent owners will incur increased costs 
defending against invalidity challenges based on AI-generated  
prior art.  
In addition to increasing the costs of prosecuting and litigating 
patents, mass-produced, AI-generated prior art will decrease the value 
of patents. AI-generated prior art resembles “secret” prior art199 in that 
it is difficult to locate, even though it is publicly available.200 The 
potential for “secret” AI-generated disclosures to surface and invalidate 
patents later in their life increases the uncertainty about the validity of 
a patent.201 The resulting uncertainty about patent validity will 
 
 194. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 
78, 101 (2013) (discussing the defense strategy of asserting invalidity and the accompanying costs). 
 195. See id. at 78 (“The defendant accused of patent infringement then has two principal 
defenses, invalidity and noninfringement . . . .”). 
 196. Id. at 101. 
 197. Id. (citing AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at  
I-153 (2011)). 
 198. A patent litigator may expose themselves to liability in a malpractice suit if they fail to 
complete a thorough check for prior art and assert the affirmative defense of invalidity. See, e.g., 
Cobrin Gittes v. GMIS, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2296 (BSJ), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10645, at *12–14 
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999) (denying summary judgement to a counter-claim defendant that was 
alleged to have committed malpractice by conducting an inadequate prior art search that 
compromised the counter-claim plaintiffs invalidity defense in a prior patent litigation suit); 
Michael J. Canning, Avoid Legal Malpractice – Timely Assert Affirmative Defenses, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/avoid-legal-malpractice-timely-assert-
affirmative-defenses [https://perma.cc/PA5A-P87T] (asserting that a malpractice suit will likely 
result from failing to assert an affirmative defense). 
 199. “Secret prior art” is a term used to describe prior art, commonly unpublished patent 
applications, that may not be available until after the filing date of a patent yet may still be prior 
art against the later filed patent. C. Douglas Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities 
Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 149–50 (1996). 
 200. Although a court may find that AI-generated disclosures are publicly available for the 
purpose of prior art, they may not actually be easy to locate in practice. For an analysis on the 
public availability, see supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 201. A larger universe of prior art would likely lead to a greater increase in the already large 
number of challenges to patent validity. Robert Stoll, Study of the Post Grant Procedures Is Needed 
Now, IPWATCHDOG (July 19, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/19/study-post-grant-
procedures-now/id=59930/ [https://perma.cc/8KVH-QU96] (finding that, as of 2015, more petitions 
for post-grant procedures challenging the validity of a patent had been filed than the USPTO 
expected, that these procedures were instituted 70% of the time, and that most claims were found 
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ultimately decrease the value of patents and increase transaction costs 
in licensing.202 It will also disincentivize inventors from pursuing patent 
protection as patents are less valuable and cost more to obtain. 
As patent protection loses its appeal, inventors will seek 
protection under trade secret law.203 Patentees can receive protection 
under trade secret law even if an invention is unpatentable.204 But 
“incentiv[izing] . . . inventors to keep their innovation secret . . . denies 
society the benefits of disclosure stemming from the patent system, 
which are anathema to trade secrets.”205 The loss to society includes the 
ideas contained in the patents, the details on how to make and use the 
invention,206 and the potential for follow-on innovation and cross 
pollination of ideas.207 Thus, society also suffers the costs created by AI-
generated disclosures. 
The disclosure contained in AI-generated disclosures is not an 
adequate replacement for the information contained in patent 
disclosures. Current AI-generated disclosures often lack information 
that would be found in patent applications, like teachings that would 
 
invalid). These high rates of invalidation may be because in some post-grant procedures at the 
USPTO, patent claims are not afforded a presumption of validity. Amanda Murphy, Michael 
Stramiello, Jonathan Stroud, Stacy Lewis & Tom Irving, Impact of America Invents Act on Biotech 
Intellectual Property, 5 COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSPS. MED., Sept. 2015, at 21, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4561394/ [https://perma.cc/HP3J-GULG]. 
 202. See Neal Solomon, The Problem of Patent Valuation, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/15/problem-patent-valuation/id=86840/ 
[https://perma.cc/VZ3G-3AV9] (“By attacking patents in IPRs, the value of patents is diminished 
because the risks of patent validity reviews substantially increase transaction costs.”); see also 
Liza Vertinsky, Reconsidering Patent Licensing in the Aftermath of Medimmune, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 
1609, 1642–43 (2009) (“To the extent that greater opportunity to challenge patents leads to greater 
litigation, which has unpredictable outcomes, the transaction costs of doing business using 
patented technology will increase.”). 
 203. Inventors often choose between either patent protection or trade secret protection, so the 
weakening of one type of protection will likely push inventors towards the other kind of protection. 
See, e.g., John J. Mahon, Jr., Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 536, 536 
(1968) (comparing patent and trade secrets as two alternative courses for legally protecting 
inventions); Leythem Wall & Katherine Banks, Patents and Secrets in the Chemical Industry, 269 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 32, 32 (2017) (“The choice between keeping proprietary information 
secret and applying for patent protection is a key commercial decision, and often the first question 
to be asked with any new technology . . . .”). 
 204. Federally, trade secrets are defined broadly as almost any information that the owner of 
the information has taken reasonable measures to maintain secrecy and that “derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the 
disclosure or use of the information.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)-(B). 
 205. TianRui Grp. Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, 
J., dissenting). 
 206. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith,  
J., dissenting). 
 207. Seymore, supra note 21, at 661. 
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enable a PHOSITA to use the invention.208 Further, AI-generated 
disclosures could render additional inventions obvious, and thus 
unpatentable under § 103, beyond just what is described in the AI-
generated disclosure.209 An AI-generated disclosure could render an 
invention obvious without itself containing the written description 
necessary to receive a patent.210 This creates an inherent gap between 
the information contained in current AI-generated disclosures and the 
information provided in patent applications, slowing the progress  
of science.211 
C. Differentiating AI-Generated Disclosures  
from Traditional Strategic Disclosures 
So how do AI-generated disclosures, which impose such 
externalities on society and the inventor, differ from currently accepted 
strategic disclosure practices? Simply put, current AI technologies that 
produce AI-generated disclosures lack the ability to comprehend the 
ideas that they describe. In contrast, the ideas contained in traditional 
strategic disclosures are the result of careful research and analysis, 
which injects those ideas into the realm of public knowledge, allows for 
the valuation of those ideas, and advances technology. An example is 
helpful to illustrate this distinction. 
Think of disclosure-generating AI as a monkey on a 
typewriter.212 The monkey may type an incredible book, yet to the 
monkey, the words are no more than shapes on the page. Unlike a 
human author, the monkey does not recognize the value of what it has 
created. Even if the monkey’s book resides in a library or is published 
 
 208. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (providing an example of deficiencies in an AI-
generated disclosure). 
 209. Cf. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–52 (en banc) (discussing 
how a description that merely renders an invention obvious is insufficient to meet the written 
description requirement). Remember that a reference may render a claimed invention obvious 
without actually describing or having strict identity with the claimed invention. See supra note 86 
and accompanying text. 
 210. Cf. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351–52. In Ariad, the court held that a description that “merely 
renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.” Id. at 1352. This implies that a 
description can be sufficient to render an invention obvious without meeting the written 
description requirement for patentability. This discrepancy has been recognized by others. See, 
e.g., In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Seymore, supra note 12, at 933. 
 211. One way that the patent system seeks to promote the progress of science is through the 
disclosure of information in publications of issued patents. See supra notes 16–18 and 
accompanying text. 
 212. The idea that a monkey typing on a typewriter might randomly produce something of 
value comes from classic proposition of Émile Borel. PRAKASH GORROOCHURN, CLASSIC PROBLEMS 
OF PROBABILITY 208–10 (2012). Disclosure-generating AI may be more likely to create something 
of value than a monkey on a typewriter, but importantly for the purposes of this illustration, 
disclosure-generating AI and a monkey both are unable to comprehend what they actually produce.  
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on the internet, it does not have value until someone comes along, reads 
it, and discovers its value. That is the point at which the information 
would actually enter the realm of public knowledge, but under current 
patent doctrines, the book will still be prior art as of the date it appeared 
in the library (given other requirements are met).213  
The importance of the comprehension and recognition of prior 
art is underrecognized because it exists inherently in traditional prior 
art. People rarely sit down, randomly type on a keyboard, and publish 
the result. Rather, they conduct research, test various solutions, and 
condense the results into a publication.214 The process of researching, 
testing, and analyzing has a filtering effect that, although imperfect,215 
separates more valuable ideas from less valuable ones. This allows 
inventors and society to focus resources on developing the ideas that are 
most likely to produce long-term value. Without separating between 
superior and inferior inventions, there is no way to efficiently  
allocate resources. 
In short, although many prior art requirements exist, the 
advancement of AI technology coupled with weak prior art 
requirements will permit AI-generated disclosures to render deserving 
inventions unpatentable. As a result, the incentives for inventors to 
invent and disclose new technologies will decrease as prosecution and 
litigation costs increase and patent value decreases. Meanwhile, those 
in the best position to utilize the information contained in AI-generated 
disclosures will have to struggle through the disarray of AI-generated 
disclosures without an efficient way to separate the wheat from  
the chaff. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AI-GENERATED DISCLOSURES 
To ensure inadequate AI-generated disclosures do not render 
otherwise novel inventions unpatentable, the patentability assessment 
must undergo several changes. First, prior art should satisfy a 
 
 213. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that general library 
procedures for indexing, cataloging, and shelving a thesis were conclusive evidence that the 
reference was prior art prior to the critical date of the patent). 
 214. See Akweli Parker, You Have an Idea for an Invention . . . Now What?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
https://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/inventions/you-have-an-idea-for-an-invention-now-
what1.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3HGA-GERR] (discussing how many 
inventors write down or make auditory recordings of their ideas, take lots of notes on their work, 
or record experimental results). 
 215. Many ideas are not appreciated by society at large in their time; however, at least some 
people must appreciate the value of these inventions in order to continue to pursue their 
development. See Clinton Nguyen, 7 World-Changing Inventions That Were Ridiculed when They 
Came Out, BUS. INSIDER, (Aug. 2, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/inventions-
that-were-ridiculed-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/LP4T-GCYK]. 
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conception requirement before it can invalidate a patent. Second, AI-
generated disclosures should not receive the presumption of 
enablement, and the party asserting the AI-generated disclosure as 
prior art should have the burden of showing that it is enabling.  
A. Conception of the Knowledge in AI-Generated Disclosures 
Implementing a conception requirement for prior art will ensure 
that AI-generated disclosures have actually contributed to public 
knowledge and have undergone some evaluation before they can render 
an invention unpatentable. Before the enaction of the Leahy Smith 
America Invents Act (“AIA”), conception was a significant doctrine in 
patent law.216 The PTO defines conception as “the complete 
performance of the mental part of the inventive act and . . . the 
formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea 
of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied 
in practice.”217 For conception to occur, there must be “contemporaneous 
recognition and appreciation of the invention.”218 However, conception 
does not mean that the inventor knows that the invention will work or 
is patentable.219 
A factfinder would apply a conception requirement similarly to 
other substantive prior art requirements. For example, when an 
examiner analyzes whether a reference satisfies the prior art 
requirements, he would make an additional determination of whether 
conception of the disclosure had occurred. Proof of conception would 
vary for different types of prior art. Any form of reduction to practice 
would be proof of conception because reduction to practice necessarily 
 
 216. Pre-AIA, if two inventors filed an application for the same invention, the inventor who 
submitted the application later could receive priority over the earlier-filing inventor if he could 
prove that he conceived of the invention first and worked diligently to reduce the invention to 
practice. See MPEP § 2138.01(I) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017). The rules surrounding the first-
to-invent system will remain relevant until approximately 2034. Murphy et al., supra note 201,  
at 1. 
 217. MPEP § 2138.04 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (quoting Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 
292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1930)). Courts have given similar definitions for conception throughout the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal 
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (using the discussed definition of conception); 
Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr 
Lab’ys, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (same). 
 218. MPEP § 2138.04(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (citing Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 
593, 596 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Invitrogen, Corp. v. Clontech Lab’ys, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915, 918 (C.C.P.A. 1972)). 
 219. Id. (citing Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228; Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 
1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
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requires recognition and appreciation for an invention.220 Thus, patents 
and patent applications would satisfy the conception requirement per 
se because filing a patent application constitutes a constructive 
reduction to practice.221 Further, producing a physical or tangible 
embodiment of an invention, which constitutes actual reduction to 
practice, would also be proof of conception.222  
A conception requirement would make a difference mostly in the 
prior art class of printed publications. The examiner would look for 
evidence of conception in the circumstances surrounding the 
publication. Publications like journal articles would certainly satisfy 
the conception requirement, as the author and editors would 
necessarily recognize and appreciate the invention when writing and 
reviewing the article. A similar analysis would occur with internet 
sources like blog posts that could be traced back to a person. To prevent 
AI-generated blog posts from passing through, a factfinder would need 
to treat disclosures that cannot be traced back to a person as AI-
generated disclosures.223  
An AI-generated disclosure alone would not satisfy the 
conception requirement. AI-generated disclosures would require 
further proof of conception either by evidence that a person reviewed 
the disclosure and recognized the described invention or by evidence 
that the AI itself was able to recognize and appreciate the idea. It is 
important to note that recognition only means that the invention 
underwent some evaluation, not that the assessed value was correct. 
Evidence that a person has recognized and appreciated the invention in 
an AI-generated disclosure could be in the form of a written analysis or 
 
 220. Reduction to practice is a patent law term of art referring to the moment when the 
inventive process is complete. NARD, supra note 17, at 246. Reduction to practice can come in two 
forms: (1) constructive reduction to practice by filing a patent application that satisfies the § 112 
requirements or (2) actual reduction to practice by constructing the invention and testing that it 
works. Id.; MPEP § 2138.05(I)-(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).   
 221. MPEP § 2138.05(IV) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (citing Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal 
S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 222. See id. § 2138.05(II). One important exception to the general rule that reduction to 
practice would show conception would be when AI generates a design that it then 3D prints. This 
is certainly a possibility as AI is already assisting in 3D printing. See Lucie Gaget, Artificial 
Intelligence and 3D Printing: Meet the Future of Manufacturing, SCULPTEO (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.sculpteo.com/blog/2018/10/24/artificial-intelligence-and-3d-printing-meet-the-future-
of-manufacturing/ [https://perma.cc/EX6T-2KRP] (discussing the present and future roll of AI in 
3D printing). Such a reference would still require further evidence that the AI was able to recognize 
and appreciate the design produced in order to qualify as prior art. See infra note 224 and 
accompanying text. 
 223. It is not unthinkable that AI could be used to develop fake blog posts. Chris O’Brien, AI-
Generated Fake Content Could Unleash a Virtual Arms Race, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 11, 2019, 5:36 
AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/11/11/ai-generated-fake-content-could-unleash-a-virtual-arms 
-race/ [https://perma.cc/64YS-Y3SC]. 
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an actual reduction to practice of the idea. Proof of AI conception could 
be in the form of computer-simulated tests of the invention.224 
Implementing a conception requirement would offer several 
benefits to both patentees and society. First, a conception requirement 
would prevent substandard prior art from rendering deserving 
inventions unpatentable—inventions that may only come to existence 
because of the incentive of a patent monopoly.225 Prior art that has not 
undergone conception is inherently substandard because it has not 
contributed any value to society. This is because, as discussed in the 
monkey example above,226 until conception occurs, an invention cannot 
be evaluated, categorized, built, commercialized, or innovated upon. 
But prior art that has undergone conception has passed through the 
knowledge filters of recognition and appreciation that help expose 
valuable ideas that could be pursued further. Additionally, inventors 
will more easily be able to find ideas that have undergone conception, 
which prevents inventors from repeating work and drives more creative 
innovation for which inventors can receive patents. Thus, a conception 
requirement prevents AI-generated disclosures from decreasing the 
incentive for inventors to develop new knowledge without providing an 
equivalent alternative source of knowledge.  
Further, because the conception requirement is not a blanket 
exclusion on using AI-generated disclosures as prior art, it provides 
incentives for programmers to develop advanced AI that is more 
beneficial to society. The AI revolution is the first time in the history of 
the patent system that a new source of prior art will develop.227 Thus, a 
unique opportunity exists for the patent system to shape prior art 
rather than conform to the existing forms of prior art. This allows the 
patent system “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts” 
in a new way.228 
 
 224. See generally Eric Winsburg, Computer Simulations in Science, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. 
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simulations-science/#SimExp [https://perma.cc 
/D38R-4UTK] (discussing the operation and capabilities of computer simulations and experiments, 
which if conducted by AI on inventions contained in AI-generated disclosures, could be sufficient 
to satisfy a conception requirement).  
 225. The nonobvious standard limits the grant of patents to only those inventions that would 
not come about without the incentive provided by a patent. See supra note 85 and accompanying 
text. Thus, if an AI-generated disclosure were to render an otherwise patentable invention 
unpatentable, it would eliminate the patent incentive and some inventions may never come into 
existence as a result. 
 226. See supra Section II.C.  
 227. Other forms of prior art mentioned in § 102 like public uses, sales, patents, and human-
generated publications were around long before the patent system’s birth in 1793. 35 U.S.C 
§ 102(a)(1); see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (creating the earliest predecessor to the 
current U.S. patent system). 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Another advantage of the conception requirement is the ease of 
implementation. Most of the substantive requirements for prior art are 
judicially developed doctrines.229 Because the conception requirement 
would be similar to these existing doctrines, it would likely take only a 
decision from the Federal Circuit to introduce the requirement.230 The 
requirement could be statutorily justified under the AIA, which states 
that prior art includes anything that is “available to the public,” on the 
grounds that conception is a prerequisite to public availability.231 
Further, there is already an abundance of case law defining 
conception.232 Thus, this requirement would not create much 
uncertainty for practitioners and, even once implemented, would begin 
to change case outcomes only as AI-generated prior art becomes  
more common. 
These benefits would come at a cost. While case law on 
conception is abundant, the evidence needed to prove conception for AI-
generated disclosures may be uncertain. Further, the types of evidence 
needed to show conception for an AI-generated disclosure may only be 
accessible to AI owners and not the defendants and patent examiners 
asserting the prior art.233 This could increase discovery costs and create 
uncertainty as the evidentiary laws develop. 
Further, as most prior art is discovered during patent 
prosecution, patent examiners would assume the burden of showing 
that prior art meets the conception requirement. 234 This burden on 
patent examiners could increase the costs of patent prosecution and the 
pendency of patent applications. There may be some irony, however, in 
that AI may help alleviate any burden that the conception requirement 
creates for patent examiners. Some have proposed that AI could help 
 
 229. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant judicial doctrines). 
 230. The Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction over all appeals in patent cases filed in 
federal district courts and from decisions of the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Court 
Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-
jurisdiction (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K69S-QKV5]. Nearly 67% of the cases 
heard by the Federal Circuit involve patent disputes. Id. Thus, the Federal Circuit has an 
incredible amount of influence over the development of patent law jurisprudence. 
 231. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The Supreme Court has held that this language, which the AIA 
introduced, was not an attempt to change the well settled common-law doctrines surrounding prior 
art. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019). Thus, public 
accessibility is still a “touchstone” of determining whether a disclosure is available as prior art. 
See sources cited supra note 36. Therefore, the statute language could justify a conception 
requirement as a prerequisite for public accessibility.  
 232. See supra notes 216–218 and accompanying text (providing relevant examples). 
 233. For proposed types of evidence of conception for AI-generated disclosures, see supra note 
220 and accompanying text. 
 234. Only 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, while examiners compare every patent to the prior 
art during examination. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 75, 75, 79 (2005). 
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examiners handle their dockets by performing tasks like prior art 
searches.235 This would allow examiners to focus on inspecting the 
quality of prior art. Thus, as examiners have more time to consider and 
examine the prior art under the proposed requirements, there should 
ultimately be an increase in the quality of the patents issued.236 
B. Removing the Presumption of Enablement 
Prior art, or at least AI-generated prior art, should not receive 
the presumption of enablement.237 Rather, the party asserting a prior 
art reference should have to show that it is enabling because they are 
the least-cost avoider for producing the evidence.238 Once the proponent 
of the prior art reference has met this burden, the opposing party may 
then offer evidence to rebut the proponent’s showing of enablement. The 
burden could still shift back and forth, but the ultimate burden to show 
that the prior art is enabling would still be on the proponent.239 Further, 
under this proposal, the standard for anticipatory enablement would 
not change. Prior art would need to enable a PHOSITA only to make, 
rather than make and use, a prior art invention in order to satisfy the 
anticipatory enablement requirement.240 Additionally, like the 
 
 235. See Udi Cohen, Artificial Intelligence Will Help to Solve the USPTO’s Patent Quality 
Problem, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/11/23/artificial-
intelligence-will-help-solve-usptos-patent-quality-problem/id=116302/ [https://perma.cc/PS4Z-
JWMJ] (discussing how AI will help increase the efficiency of the patent application review process 
by helping examiners conduct prior art searches). 
 236. The poor quality of issued patents is a major issue. Based on invalidation rates by courts, 
the estimated number of patents that are invalid in whole or in part may be as high as forty to 
forty-five percent. See Josh Landau, A Little More Than Forty Percent: Outcomes at the PTAB, 
District Court, and the EPO, PAT. PROGRESS (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/05/01/a-little-more-than-forty-percent/ 
[https://perma.cc/4U2U-LASG] (analyzing patent invalidation rates at the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board and the European Patent Office). 
 237. Other academics have suggested eliminating the presumption that prior art references 
are enabling as a way to restrict insufficient prior art in other contexts. See supra Seymore, note 
12, at 959–60 (arguing for eliminating the presumption of enablement and restricting what 
secondary references can show that prior art is enabling as a way of preventing inadequate prior 
art from rendering an invention unpatentable). 
 238. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing issues associated with proving  
a negative). 
 239. Under the current regime, while the proponent of the prior art disclosure receives a 
presumption that it is enabling, she still carries the ultimate burden of showing enablement. See 
In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[P]reponderance of the evidence is the standard 
that must be met by the PTO in making rejections . . . .”). This would not change under the  
new regime. 
 240. Although changing the anticipatory enablement standard to require that prior art enable 
a PHOSITA to make and use the invention contained in a prior art disclosure, current 
shortcomings with the utility requirement of § 101 make a use requirement in anticipatory 
enablement undesirable. For a discussion of nominal utility and other shortcomings of the utility 
requirement, see Nathan Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility 
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conception requirement, the Federal Circuit could probably eliminate 
the presumption of enablement without legislative intervention by 
overturning its own precedent.241 
By eliminating the presumption of enablement, nonenabling AI-
generated disclosures will no longer be able to pass as enabling merely 
because of the difficulty of proving that they are nonenabling.242 
Further, either the AI-generated disclosure itself or secondary 
references 243 must affirmatively show that the AI-generated disclosure 
would enable a PHOSITA to make the described invention. Even if the 
disclosure contained a method of making the contained invention, the 
disclosure would not receive a presumption of enablement. The 
proponent of the disclosure would still need to show that the method in 
the AI-generated disclosure is enabling. 
One benefit of eliminating the presumption of enablement is 
that it will incentivize programmers to create more robust techniques 
for AI-generation of disclosures. Requiring AI-generated disclosures to 
prove enabling will require better AI techniques to generate the more 
robust disclosures, or alternatively, persons could supplement the AI-
generated disclosures with additional text to satisfy the anticipatory 
enablement requirement.244 Like the addition of the conception 
requirement, eliminating the presumption of enablement is not a 
blanket exclusion on AI-generated disclosures. Rather, it incentivizes 
creating more powerful AI, which indirectly furthers patent law’s 





Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 433–35 (1999) (discussing how 
the utility requirement of § 101 is so low that it may be satisfied with merely a nominal utility). 
 241. Although patents enjoy a statutory presumption of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 282, 
other printed publications do not. Yet courts still apply a presumption of enablement to nonpatent 
references. See In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
presumption of enablement applied to nonpatent publications). Thus, the Federal Circuit could 
take a step back and eliminate this presumption. See also supra notes 229–230 and accompanying 
text (discussing the ease of implementing a conception requirement). 
 242. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties associated with the 
burden of proving a negative).  
 243. The scope of enablement would still only include what is in the disclosure and what is 
within the knowledge of a PHOSITA. Thus, secondary references could only show what was within 
the knowledge of a PHOSITA. For a discussion of the current use of secondary references in 
showing enablement, see supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 244. Supplementing the prior art disclosure using human generated texts could also be one 
way of satisfying the conception requirement. See supra note 220 and accompanying text 
(discussing how AI-generated prior art could satisfy conception). 
 245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
        
560 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:521 
Further, eliminating the presumption of enablement will ensure 
that prior art itself contributes to the advancement of technology before 
it renders deserving inventions unpatentable.246 The details of the 
invention, like how to make and use the invention, are what a patent 
provides as consideration in the patent law quid pro quo.247 In contrast, 
the quid pro quo inherent in strategic disclosure is that an inventor will 
publicly disclose some details of the invention in exchange for the PTO 
not granting a patent to anyone else.248 The party seeking to 
strategically disclose an invention, however, should still provide some 
benefit to society through this exchange.249 The basic description of the 
physical structure of an invention in current AI-generated disclosures 
does not provide enough benefit to society to justify the strategic 
disclosure quid pro quo. Thus, eliminating this presumption will 
guarantee that society receives valuable information either through 
strategic disclosure or a patent application.  
The costs of eliminating the presumption of enablement, like 
implementing a conception requirement, include burdening patent 
examiners.250 Unlike a conception requirement, removing the 
presumption of enablement would increase an examiner’s workload 
with respect to every reference they cite against a patent application. 
Because it is common to assert multiple prior art references against a 
single patent application,251 the burden of showing that prior art is 
enabling may multiply several times in a single rejection. If this were a 
substantial burden on patent examiners, it may increase the patent 
prosecution costs and patent application pendency. Both represent costs 






 246. For a discussion of how unenabled prior art may pass through the anticipatory 
enablement requirement, see supra Sections I.B.2 and II.A.2.  
 247. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (“It is the details of how to make and use an invention that are of value in the  
patent disclosure.”). 
 248. Lichtman et al., supra note 132, at 2177 (discussing how a competitor may publish a 
strategic disclosure in order to prevent an inventor from receiving patent protection). 
 249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing current burdens experienced by 
patent inspectors). 
 251. Dennis Crouch, References Cited, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/11/references-cited.html [https://perma.cc/78L9-EE2L] (stating 
that the average patent issued in 2016 has over fifty references cited against it). 
 252. See supra note 192 (discussing how the PTO could pass off future costs to patentees). 
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receive patents with shorter enforceable terms.253 Thus, while these 
requirements would protect some patentees from having their 
inventions rendered unpatentable, all patentees would bear the 
financial burden. 
One way to alleviate some of this burden is to eliminate the 
presumption of enablement for only nonpatent disclosures. For patents 
that have already issued, a patent examiner has presumably previously 
found that the patent would enable a PHOSITA to make and use the 
disclosed invention.254 Requiring patent examiners to repeat the work 
of their colleagues would be wasteful and show disdain for the patent 
examination process. Thus, allowing the presumption of enablement to 
remain with respect to issued patents would reduce some of the burden 
on patent examiners and would be consistent with the statutory 
requirement that patents are valid.255 Additionally, like with the 
conception requirement, AI could play a role in alleviating the burden 
on patent examiners during prosecution.256 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the patent system is to incentivize inventors to 
develop and disclose inventions by providing a patent monopoly. Mass-
produced, AI-generated disclosures, however, are threatening to defeat 
the patentability of deserving inventions and thus the incentive for 
inventors to develop and disclose their invention. These AI-generated 
disclosures are poor substitutes for the information provided by patent 
applications. Current patent law doctrines are ill-equipped to handle 
the unique problems associated with AI-generated disclosures. By 
creating a conception requirement and eliminating the presumption of 
enablement for AI-generated disclosures, the patent system will be able 





 253. The current patent term is 20 years from the earliest effective filing date. Patent Term 
Adjustment: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/patent-term-
adjustment (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GGT2-5724]. Thus, time spent 
prosecuting a patent results in a shorter life of enforceability. See id. (stating that Congress found 
that patent prosecution delays were eating into the lifespan of patents). However, patent term 
adjustments, granted for certain delays at the patent office, may reduce the impact of increased 
pendency. Id. 
 254. To issue, a patent must enable a PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention. 35 
U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 255. 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 256. See supra note 235–236 and accompanying text (discussing specific uses for AI as a 
burden alleviator). 
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art, which preserves the incentive for inventors to pursue patent 
protection while creating an incentive for programmers to develop more 
robust AI capable of producing information-rich disclosures. Thus, this 
Note proposes a solution that helps maximize technological 
advancement by stimulating AI-driven and human-driven innovation.   
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